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user actually receives. A paper water right is so named because, as
here, when there is not enough water to fulfill the entitlement, the
right exists only on paper. In addressing this problem, the court
found the EIR did not view Article 18(b) as a feasible alternative and
instead summarily dismissed it as infeasible. The EIR failed to
meaningfully analyze the permanent proportionate decrease
provisions of Article 18(b) to reflect SWP's actual yield as a project
alternative.
On the whole, the court found the EIR's analysis defective because
it did not sufficiently provide the public with a base line against which
to measure the project, the status quo, and the alternatives. In
reversing the trial court, the court held harmless error review
inapplicable to a court evaluating the statutory mandates of CEQA.
Thus, the trial court's conclusion that the EIR was sufficient even
though the agency drafting it was not the proper lead agency
constituted reversible error. The court also reversed the trial court's
dismissal for failure to serve indispensable parties because the reverse
validation proceeding was an in rem action whose only indispensable
party consisted of the public agency owning the res.
Susan P. Klopman
San Luis Coastal Unified Sch. Dist. v. City of Morro Bay, 97 Cal. Rptr.
2d 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding section 1810 of the California
"Wheeling Statutes" did include as a transferor entitled to use a city's
water conveyance facility's unused capacity, a school district
purchasing less expensive water from the county).
The San Luis Unified School District ("School District") appealed
the trial court'sjudgment denying a writ of mandate against the City of
Morro Bay ("City"). The writ would compel the City to allow the
School District to use the excess capacity of the City's water
conveyance facility to transfer water purchased by the School District
from San Luis County ("County") to schools within the City. Section
1810 of the California Water Code required public agencies to allow
bona fide transferors to use excess unused capacity in their water
conveyance facility in return for fair compensation. The School
District argued it was a "bona fide transferor" within the meaning of
section 1810.
The trial court ruled the School District was not included within
the definition of a "transferor" because a "transferor" was limited to
those who contracted for the sale of water. The trial court agreed with
the City that the School District had a contract to purchase water, not
a contract for the sale of water. Therefore, the School District was not
a transferor entitled to use the City's water conveyance system.
The court of appeals reversed. First, the court ruled the School
District was a transferor within the statute. The court stated a contract
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for purchase only exists with a corresponding contract for sale from
the County, and whether the transferee or transferor actually applied
for the use of the conveyance system was not important.
Second, the court of appeals rejected the City's argument that the
conveyance facility contemplated in the statute included only
aqueducts and canals, and not local distribution systems. The court
stated the legislature would have specifically excluded local
distribution systems from the statute if that was the legislature's intent.
The court ruled the City had no duty to allow the School District to use
the City storage facility for any period longer than the incidental use
time necessary to convey the water.
Third, the court of appeals rejected the City's argument that the
statute should not be enforced because the School District's use did
not promote the statute's conservation purpose. The court stated the
statute did not indicate conservation was the statute's only purpose.
Therefore, the School District's purpose of reducing cost was
acceptable.
Finally, the court of appeals rejected the City's argument that
allowing the School District's use of the water conveyance system
violated section 1810(d) of the Water Code. Section 1810 did not
allow use of the water conveyance facility if the use caused legal injury
to other legal users. The City argued the agreement violated this
provision, because injury would occur to other legal users due to the
increases in the City's water prices if the School District did not
purchase its water from the City. The court rejected this argument
stating an increased water prices was not the type of injury the
legislature intended to prevent.
The court remanded the case with the instruction that the trial
court order the City to produce the information listed in section 1812,
including the amount and availability of the conveyance facility's
unused capacity and the terms and conditions of the facility's use.
Tiffany Turner

COLORADO
Bd.of County Comnm'rs v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n, 14 P.3d
325 (Colo. 2000) (holding that the Gunnison River, located in the
Aspinall Unit, did not contain sufficient water for Arapahoe County to
meet the "can and will" requirement of a conditional water right
decree).
The Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County
("Arapahoe") applied for a decree for a conditional water right. The
District Court, Water Division No. 4, denied Arapahoe's application,

